relationship between these concepts is not fixed but open ended, as Clausen (1998, p.203, emphasis added) puts it: 'every major role transition can quite reasonably be considered as potentially constituting a turning point'. Over the past few decades, military scholars have found great value in applying these concepts to different cohorts of public military veteran to assess the extent to which their military careers have represented notable turning points in their various life course trajectories (Elder, 1986; Elder et al, 1991; Maclean and Elder, 2007) . Following in this tradition, the article focuses on three specific questions relating to of soldiers-turned-contractors who had by this time returned to the UK as private military veterans, the article reveals that most were employed in the 'protective service occupations', where they were significantly overrepresented as a proportion compared to UK public military veterans and the UK general population. Breaking the data down further, the article illustrates how virtually all of the private military veterans in this category were in fact working in the private security industry as managers or street-level operatives. Reflecting upon this clustering effect, the article contends that making the transition from the public military sector to the private military sector does appear to represent a notable turning point in the socioeconomic trajectories of many private military veterans and goes on to advance an explanation for this phenomenon which incorporates the following contextual variables: occupational culture; military skillsets; training and recruitment; occupational licensing; and professional networks. The article accordingly concludes that (in the case of the Project Matrix cohort at least) private military veterans are not following similar trajectories to public military veterans and, as a consequence, we need to construct a new empirical and conceptual knowledge base if we are to comprehend this new category of veteran -a process which requires nothing less than uprooting the concept of 'veteran' from its traditional state-centric foundations and laying it bare to the messy realities of 'postmodern' warfare (Coker 2012) .
Before commencing with this line of enquiry, however, a brief note on interdisciplinarity and terminology is required. Over the past couple of decades, scholars writing in the discipline of international relations (IR) have variously termed those individual contractors working in international military contexts as 'private military contractors', 'private security contractors' or 'private military and security contractors'. At the same time, scholars writing in the discipline of criminology have termed those individual contractors working in domestic policing contexts as 'private security contractors'. The same term -'private security contractor' -has therefore been used to describe two related but ultimately different occupations. While this terminological overlap has the potential to cause confusion, this has largely been avoided to date because contractors have for the most part remained in either international military or domestic policing contexts and have been studied within the disciplines of international relations or criminology respectively. However, the contractors under examination in this article are interesting precisely because their lived experiences break down these scholarly distinctions. To sidestep any potentially confusing terminological overlaps, then, in what follows the term 'private military' relates to the international military workspace and the term 'private security' relates to the domestic policing workspace. These terminological specifications also serve to highlight the interdisciplinary scope of the article, which not only bridges the fields of private military studies and veterans studies, but also stands at the 'crossroads' of IR and criminology (Bigo, 2016 ).
Definitions
The first task is to define the concept of a 'private military veteran'. To do this, it is necessary to briefly sketch out the contours of the private military labor market. The origins of this market can be traced to the mass demobilization which followed the end of the Cold War. Eager to realize the much anticipated 'peace dividend' after the fall of the Soviet Union, leaders throughout the Global North initiated extensive military downsizing programs amounting to a collective reduction of something like 7 million soldiers, thereby significantly reducing their frontline military capacity (Singer, 2008, p.53) . The assumption of a sustained post-Cold War peace settlement proved to be a false one, however. The thinning out of superpower military presence had the unanticipated effect of releasing many long-suppressed civil tensions across Eastern Europe, Africa and South Asia, causing a groundswell of smallscale wars (Kaldor, 2012) . While many states saw it as being in their interests to intervene in these wars, they no longer had the immediate capacity to do so. Following neoliberal logic, they proceeded to address this shortfall in part by turning to the many private military companies now being formed by shrewd entrepreneurs seeking to profit from this situation (Ortiz, 2010) . While in the period 1950-89 these companies featured in 15 conflicts, between 1990-2000 they were present in no less than 80, including those in Yugoslavia, Albania, the Gulf region and East Timor (Rosen, 2008, p.79-80) . The emergent private military labor market then experienced a further period of unprecedented expansion following the post-9/11 interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Coalition forces found themselves facing down unexpected resistance from insurgents and once again turned to the market in order to compensate for a shortfall in frontline capacity (Isenberg, 2009 ).
For many years, however, it was not really known how many private military contractors there actually were in this labor market -estimates of workforce size were often accompanied by so many caveats they were rendered unusable. Fortunately, the picture became a little clearer in the mid-2000s when, faced with a series of questions about the controversial use of contractors in US military operations, Congress instructed the Executive to keep more accurate records of its dealings in this market (Cancian, 2008 (Peters, Schwartz and Kapp, 2015) .
While these data relate to just one buyer -albeit the biggest one in the market -given their systematic nature in an otherwise haphazard numbers game, they do serve as a valuable guide to the fluctuating scale of the private military labor market.
In the mid-2000s, the controversies surrounding the private military industry also began to attract the attention of IR scholars, who duly brought into effect the field of private military studies. These scholars have tended to focus more on the role of powerful states and companies than they have on individual contractors (Eichler, 2014 ). Yet a reasonable amount has nevertheless been discovered about the dynamics of the private military labor market.
While the most prominent lines of enquiry in this vein relate to issues of health (Dunigan et al., 2013) , race and nationality (Chisholm, 2015) and gender (Eichler, 2015) , it is the research on past employment which interests us the most here -in particular the common observation that virtually all private military contractors are public military veterans. As Singer (2008, p.76) puts it: 'the very name "ex" -ex-Green Beret, ex-Paratrooper, ex-General, and so ondefines the employee base of the private military industry'. This is mainly because skillsets developed in the armed forces -especially the pre-reflexive discharge of violence -serve as the key determinant of value in the private military labor market (Higate, 2012) . The significance of this observation is that it brings into focus a distinctive life course transition from the public military sector into the private military sector (Hawks, 2014) . However, the extent to which this transition actually constitutes a turning point in the long term life course trajectories of these individuals remains an unanswered question because we still know nothing about what happens to private military contractors after they leave the sector -a lacuna which becomes even more striking when we remind ourselves that the private military Hopefully, though, as more private military veteran case studies come to light, this definition will be challenged and refined, giving rise to a more robust taxonomy through which to investigate this phenomenon. The importance of this definition is that it encourages us to pick up the different threads of military life course research -socioeconomic status, family relations, physical and mental health and so on -and weave them through this new category of veteran. As a first step in this research agenda, the remainder of the article focuses on socioeconomic trajectories. While these particular trajectories are usually further broken down into four interlinked components -employment patterns, education, earnings and mobility (Maclean and Elder, 2007 ) -due to data limitations we focus here exclusively upon employment patterns in the civilian labor market.
Methodology
Data for life course research generally come in one of two forms: cohort study data specifically collected for the purpose of life course research and longitudinal data originally collected for some other purpose but retooled for life course research (Colby 1998) . Given the limited number of available cohort studies (which are resource intensive undertakings), together with the relative newness and invisibility of the often secretive private military industry, the ensuing analysis (unsurprisingly) draws upon retooled longitudinal data. That said, finding any kind of longitudinal data relating to the employment patterns of private military veterans is no easy task. Indeed, the reason why there is so little research on these patterns is not simply down to scholarly oversight, but also because of their elusiveness. At first glance, the most obvious data sources are the main buyers and sellers in the market for (Kinsey, 2009; Isenberg, 2009 States, one ex-Australian and one ex-French), with about two-thirds coming from the infantry and marines (n=40). They were also experienced and fresh from service. The average length of service was 12.5 years and most had not left active duty until the post-9/11 era (n=60). generalizing from this case study. Given the difficulties in conducting any kind of empirical research on private military veterans, however, the article proceeds on the basis that, so long as these drawbacks are acknowledged, it is worthwhile operationalizing this methodology as a mechanism through which to generate a first-cut study on this new category of veteran.
Results
Four years after Project Matrix drew to a close, just under half of the Matrix Association cohort were still working in the private military labor market (n=186). The largest proportion was located in Iraq (n=71) and the second largest in Afghanistan (n=22). So even after the major drawdown of Coalition troops from Iraq and Afghanistan between 2011 and 2014, these particular private military contractors were still able to find employment in these highly unstable transitional countries. Beyond these established labor markets the picture becomes a little more nebulous. A few were located elsewhere in the Middle East (n=6), which had endured yet more instability following the turmoil of the Arab Spring. A dozen or so more had moved into the maritime sector (n=13), which had experienced a period of rapid growth around the time Project Matrix was being wound down, primarily in the form of anti-piracy operations around the Horn of Africa (Cullen and Berube, 2012) . Roughly the same number had migrated over to the various hostile environments in Africa and Asia (n=10), which have always been a mainstay in the private military labor market. Another sizeable proportion had chosen not to specify where exactly they were based (n=58) and a handful were actively seeking employment (n=6) and therefore had no present location specified. For present purposes, the key message here is that the drawdown of Coalition troops did not -for the Matrix Association cohort at least -instantly transform all private military contractors into private military veterans. There was still sufficient demand in the wider private military labor market to make this a gradual and piecemeal process, slowly unfolding over time.
By October 2015, however, just over half of the Matrix Association cohort had departed this labor market to assume new identities as private military veterans (n=192).
Most had relocated to the UK (n=137). Given that well over half of the 1,600 strong Project
Matrix workforce was British, and that virtually all those who had provided a complete employment history had served in the British Armed Forces, it seems likely that this particular group was comprised of UK citizens heading home to their country of birth following a period in the private military labor market -though in the absence of any concrete data on nationality this is no more than an educated inference. The second largest proportion had moved to North America (n=24) and two smaller clutches had gone elsewhere in Europe (n=9) and to Australasia (n=4). This means that about nine in every ten of these private military veterans had journeyed to the Global North after leaving private military labor market. Countering this trend, however, just under one in every ten had settled in the Global South, namely in the Middle East (n=5), Africa (n=5), Asia (n=2) and Central America (n=1). Lastly, a minority declined to specify their present location (n=5).
Of those who had returned to the UK, 111 were in employment, 12 were unemployed, one was a student, one was retired and 12 declined to specify their exact employment status. in their socioeconomic trajectories, for it has greatly increased the likelihood that they will end up working in the private security industry when they return home. We should not seek out any kind of 'grand theory' in answer to this question. As Mayer (2009, p.423) points out, while the life course perspective has a 'relatively full conceptual tool kit' -incorporating, among other things, 'trajectories', 'transitions' and 'turning points'
-it 'lacks a coherent body of theory'. Indeed, he continues, 'because there is not just one mechanism underlying the social structuring of human lives … one might contend that a simple, unified sociological theory of the life course is not possible' (Mayer, 2009, p.423) .
We should instead concentrate our attention on teasing out the more localized contextual factors at play in shaping any given life course trajectory. With this in mind, we hereafter offer up four contextual factors which go a long way towards explaining the distinctive socioeconomic trajectories of UK private military veterans in the civilian labor market:
'common factors', 'present factors', 'absent factors' and 'network factors'.
'Common factors' help to explain why both public military veterans and private military veterans are more likely to find employment in the private security industry compared to the general population. In the first instance, Higate (2001) and Cooper et al. (2016) suggest that UK public military veterans are more likely to be drawn towards this particular sector of the civilian labor market because it exhibits a comparable masculine occupational culture to the public military and also places a high economic and cultural value on public military skillsets (these factors are also prominent in the employment patterns of US public military veterans, see : Schulker et al., 2016) . While there is of course no parallel analysis on the extent to which private military veterans also prioritize these factors in the civilian labor market, there is good reason to suspect they do. In making the transition from the public military sector into the private military sector, they have already demonstrated a strong preference for seeking out continuities in both masculine occupational culture and military skillsets. It is reasonable to assume that in surveying the civilian labor market, they might continue to express this preference and thus walk the same path as their public sector counterparts. In other words, the private military sector can in effect be viewed as an additional step in the same employment pathway. As such, the presence of a masculine opportunities.
x The effect of this program -and others like it -is to facilitate the transition of public military veterans into almost every sector of the UK economy, as Table 1 and Figure 1 clearly demonstrate. Importantly, there is no equivalent program for recently demobilized private military veterans (though in theory a private military veteran who had left service less than two years beforehand may still be able to access CTP assistance to some degree The SIA has nothing to do with hostile environments, but that hasn't stopped CSCs
[commercial security companies] from using the organization as a marketing tool to win contracts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. Many CSCs boast to potential clients that its employees are SIA accredited (Shepherd 2008, p.256) .
One (unintended) consequence of this process is that licence holders are eligible to work in the UK private security industry with immediate effect, thereby removing a sizeable barrier to entry into this particular sector of the civilian labor market (White, forthcoming contracting, they are themselves more likely to do so' (Hawks, 2014, p.82) . As a group, in other words, private military contractors exhibit a kind of herd behavior in their post-service employment patterns. It is reasonable to assume that they would continue to exhibit this behavior -at least to a degree -in their subsequent transition into the civilian labor market.
Working this assumption forwards, this means that if -through the foregoing 'absent factors'
and 'present factors' -private military veterans begin to establish a foothold in the private security industry, this 'multiplier effect' may serve to further accentuate this foothold over time. This 'network factor' may therefore explain why private military veterans are likely to establish a disproportionately strong presence in the private security industry compared to public military veterans.
When all four factors are considered together, then, we have the beginnings of a model for explaining why UK private military veterans are significantly overrepresented in the UK private security industry when compared to UK public military veterans and the UK general population. We also have a better understanding of why the transition from the public military sector into the private military sector appears to represent a notable turning point in the socioeconomic trajectories of private military veterans. As Figure 2 illustrates, it is a consequence of the 'absent factors', 'present factors' and 'network factors' which differentiate the socioeconomic trajectories of private military veterans from those of public military veterans (see Figure 2) . However, it is important to emphasize that, in accordance with the article's inductive line of enquiry, this explanatory framework is preliminary in nature. Its explanatory power is something to be empirically tested in future studies on private military veterans.
Conclusion
The article set out to discover whether or not private military veterans follow similar life course trajectories to public military veterans. In the case of the Matrix Association diaspora, it has now revealed they do not. For this cohort, the transition from the public military sector into the private military sector seems to represent a notable turning point in their socioeconomic trajectories, as they go on to develop highly distinctive occupational profiles as private military veterans in the UK civilian labor market. This is an important finding because it emphasizes that we really are in the dark when it comes to this emergent category of veteran. If we had found similarities, then moving forward we could have focused our attention on drawing inferences about private military veterans from the extensive life course research already conducted on public military veterans. But we now know this is not necessarily a wise option. Instead, we need to begin the process of constructing a new empirical and conceptual knowledge base if we are to comprehend the life course trajectories of private military veterans. This article represents a valuable first step in this process, but there is much more to be done. of variables to examine are the remaining socioeconomic indicators -education, earnings and mobility -followed by (in no particular order) various measures of family and community, health and wellbeing, race and nationality, governance and policy, crime and criminality.
Third, we need different 'types' of data. Specifically, we need data which maps out the life course trajectories of private military veterans at the aggregate level -such as the Matrix Association case study -as well as data in which individual private military veterans reflect upon these trajectories, thus allowing us to compare 'objective' and 'subjective' accounts of the various transitions and turning points embedded within these trajectories.
New data across these categories would facilitate the construction of better explanatory models. While the model depicted in Figure 2 serves as a valuable starting point, it abstracts from just one cohort, one socioeconomic variable and one data type. Bringing into frame multiple cohorts, multiple variables and multiple data types would enable the development of more sophisticated models which articulate how a much wider range of contextual factors shape the life course trajectories of private military veterans (as they always do when examined in sufficient detail). Furthermore, new data would also help us to formulate policies which address the more negative dimensions of these life course trajectories, such as unemployment, social and economic exclusion, poor physical and mental health and criminal behavior. Governments and charities have for a long time done this for public military veterans. Perhaps now time to consider whether or not they should do the same for private military veterans -though this course of action would likely prove to be controversial since it could be perceived as an official endorsement of the privatization of warfare.
To be sure, constructing a knowledge base along these lines would be time consuming and tricky. But the field of veterans studies has adapted to new challenges like this before and it can do so again. A decade ago, for instance, Camacho and Atwood (2007) criticized the field for its preoccupation with male veterans from the Global North. In the intervening years, however, the field has responded by exploring, among other things, the experiences of female veterans (Crowley and Sandhoff, 2016) , veterans from Africa (Maringira, Gibson and Richters, 2015) and veterans from Asia (Maharajan and Krishnaveni, 2016) . The underlying message of this article is that now is the moment to add another more category of veteran to this diversifying field of research: the private military veteran.
End Notes i
In this article, the term 'socioeconomic status' is used in its basic form to mean the social standing of an individual or group measured in terms of education, employment, earnings and mobility.
ii It is important to note that the aforementioned US DoD data relating to the number of private military contractors on its payroll in Iraq and Afghanistan does not record where these contractors go once they leave these countries.
iii www. 
